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A B S T R A C T
We examine the eﬀects of the revised Basel II rules on bank managers’ discre-
tionary behavior, speciﬁcally income smoothing and loan loss provisioning. As
the revised rules exert greater regulatory pressure on corporate than retail
banking, we predict corporate bank managers to reduce risk-taking activities
or increase income smoothing. Analysis of segmental reports reveals greater
(less) income smoothing in the corporate banking segments of low-capital
(high-capital) banks during the Basel II period, with their managers recogniz-
ing loan loss provisions in a less timely fashion. We ﬁnd no such eﬀects for
retail banking. Although we document an initially negative market reaction
to the regulatory announcements, that reaction weakens over time. Overall,
the study highlights the unintended consequences of the banking rule changes.
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1. Introduction
The Basel II Accord places greater emphasis on the risk sensitivity of bank assets than the 1988 Basel
Accord (i.e., Basel I). Basel II’s aim was to constrain banks’ risk-taking activities by imposing higher capital
requirements on banks with riskier assets (Basel, 2006). As banks make a trade-oﬀ concerning the returns and
risks of various activities, they may engage in more or fewer risk-taking activities in response to the proposed
changes in Basel II. In this study, we examine whether those changes are associated with a greater amount of
discretionary behavior in bank ﬁnancial reporting. Our ﬁndings suggest that the proposed changes to the
banking rules in Basel II may have had unintended consequences. The decision to require banks to improve
their capital adequacy placed some banks under increased regulatory pressure to engage in manipulative
behavior in the form of income smoothing and less timely loan loss recognition.
Prior banking research shows that bank managers have incentives to engage in three types of discretionary
behavior (e.g., Beatty et al., 1995; Collins et al., 1995; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Ahmed et al., 1999;
Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; Perez et al., 2008). First, bank managers are prone to managing capital because
proper capital management is crucial to determining the eﬀectiveness of bank operations. More speciﬁcally,
they decrease (increase) loan loss provisions when their banks’ capital adequacy ratios are high (low). Second,
bank managers have incentives to engage in income smoothing behavior, that is, to decrease (increase) loan
loss provisions when current period income is low (high). Third, bank managers may also engage in discre-
tionary behavior to signal future earning performance. Thus, they increase loan loss provisions when they
anticipate that future income will be high.
Here, we examine how bank managers react to the proposed regulatory changes to Basel II. Our speciﬁc
focus is on the eﬀects of these changes on income smoothing and the timeliness of loan loss provisioning.
By imposing more stringent capital requirements and the stricter monitoring of risky banks, the aim of the
Basel II rules was to remedy a major weakness of the Basel I Accord, that is, its failure to distinguish between
the levels of credit risk in commercial and industrial loans (Jacques, 2008). Under Basel I, all commercial
loans, regardless of credit quality, are assigned a 100% risk weight. The Basel II rules, in contrast, take into
account diﬀerences in the credit ratings of the loans banks hold (Basel, 2006). Thus, Basel II is expected to
reduce banks’ risk-taking incentives (Elizalde, 2007).
Corporate banking is generally viewed as riskier than retail banking (Kohler, 2013).2 Hence, we expect the
revised Basel II rules to adversely aﬀect corporate and investment banking to a greater extent than retail bank-
ing. The increased regulatory pressure may induce corporate banking managers to either reduce their risky
activities or engage in greater income smoothing to reduce earnings volatility and perceived risk. Corporate
banking managers in banks with low capital adequacy ratios need to maintain risky activities to sustain their
revenue streams. Hence, any reduction in those activities will negatively aﬀect earnings and shrink the bank’s
earnings base. Accordingly, we predict the corporate banking managers of low-capital banks to be likelier to
engage in greater income smoothing to reduce perceived earnings volatility and risk than their counterparts in
banks with high capital adequacy ratios, who have the capacity to curtail their risk-taking activities, and hence
may not resort to income smoothing.
We also examine the eﬀects of the rule changes on the timeliness of loan loss recognition in both the cor-
porate and retail banking sectors. The Basel II rules impose a more sophisticated risk assessment structure on
banks than the Basel I rules. They require banks to assess their capital adequacy and risk positions with
greater accuracy. Although the banks in our sample use the incurred loan loss provisioning method speciﬁed
by either U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) or International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards (IFRS), they still enjoy substantial discretion in determining their loan loss provisions. One possibility
is that the greater risk sensitivity required in regulatory reporting may spill over to banks’ ﬁnancial reporting
practices, with the result that they are timelier in recognizing loan loss provisions in their loan portfolios.
2 We deﬁne retail banking as comprising the following segments: consumer/retail banking, including credit card services, community
banking and commercial banking to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Consequently, we deﬁne corporate banking as
comprising the following segments: corporate banking and investment banking, asset/fund management, treasury/global markets, wealth/
private banking and wholesale banking. Hence, for a typical bank, retail and corporate banking activities constitute the entirety of
banking operations.
10 C.Y. Lim, K.O. Yong / China Journal of Accounting Research 10 (2017) 9–32
Another possibility, however, is that the stricter capital requirements exert greater regulatory pressure on
banks to delay their loan loss recognition to artiﬁcially bolster their reserves. We expect the corporate banking
managers in low-capital banks to be more inclined toward imposing less timely loan loss provisions because
they are more adversely aﬀected by the Basel II rule changes.
We use a sample of banks from the countries that led the Basel II Accord (i.e., the U.S., the U.K., various
European countries, Canada and Australia) to examine the eﬀects of bank regulatory changes on bank
managers’ discretionary behavior. We obtain data on these banks from the Bankscope database. Our sample
period ranges from 1999 to 2007 because the revised Basel II Accord was ﬁrst conceptualized in 1999, and had
been implemented by the majority of banks by 2007.3 We partition the sample into high-Tier 1 capital banks
and low-Tier 1 capital banks. We analyze banks at the segmental reporting level because we are interested in
assessing the diﬀerential eﬀects of Basel II on the diﬀerent business segments within a bank. Hence, we hand-
collect data on the loan loss provisions and proﬁts before those provisions and taxes of corporate banking and
retail banking from the segmental reporting section within the footnote disclosures of each bank’s ﬁnancial
statements.
We ﬁnd evidence of income smoothing by corporate banking managers in low-capital banks from 2003 to
2007 (hereafter, the ‘‘Basel II period”). Relative to the pre-Basel II period, these managers are observed to
increase (decrease) their loan loss provisions when the level of prior-period pre-tax earnings before those pro-
visions is high (low). Consistent with Kanagaretnam et al. (2004), this evidence indicates the presence of
income smoothing. In additional tests, we document a more pronounced income smoothing eﬀect in the
2005–2007 than in the 2003–2004 period.
In a second set of tests, we observe a delay in the timeliness of loan loss provision recognition by corporate
banking managers in low-capital banks during the later Basel II period (i.e., 2005–2007). This result indicates
that corporate banking managers in weaker banks faced greater regulatory pressure and thus engaged in
manipulative behavior in anticipation of the changes imposed by Basel II. In contrast, we document no dif-
ferences over time in the timeliness of loan loss provisions for retail banking during our sample period.
Finally, we examine how market participants interpreted and reacted to the eﬀects of these rule changes on
the banks aﬀected. Consistent with our hypothesis, we ﬁnd that the market initially reacted negatively to
regulatory announcements regarding Basel II implementation across banks. That negative market reaction
is also found to be stronger for banks with more corporate banking than retail banking exposure. We further
ﬁnd the initial negative market reaction to have weakened over time as banks became more geared toward
implementing the Basel II rule changes. Overall, these ﬁndings provide support for the view that Basel II
imposes diﬀerential market pressure on banks.
This study contributes to the stream of research exploring the interaction between bank manager behavior
and regulatory changes. In particular, we examine how bank managers anticipate and respond to the changes
to banks’ operating environments imposed by the regulatory authorities. Although prior research considers
how the revised Basel II guidelines have aﬀected banks in terms of capital management and procyclicality
(e.g., Gordy and Howells, 2006; Perez et al., 2008), there is little research examining whether those guidelines
induced changes in banks’ ﬁnancial reporting behavior and ﬁnancial reporting quality. We show that the
greater regulatory pressure and more intense competitive environment arising from the more stringent capital
requirements in Basel II induced greater income smoothing and deferred loan loss provisioning by bank man-
agers. Our ﬁndings have implications for regulators and accounting standard setters concerned with whether
changes to banks’ regulatory environment may lead to a deterioration in their ﬁnancial reporting quality. The
ﬁndings are particularly timely, as banks are starting to assess and prepare for the likely eﬀects of the proposed
Basel III rules on their capital structure and operating proﬁtability.
3 Unlike many regulatory changes, there is no deﬁnite cutoﬀ date for Basel II implementation. Instead, the Accord allows for phased
implementation across diﬀerent jurisdictions and banks. We end the sample period in 2007 because of the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008,
which imposed signiﬁcant changes on banks’ operations and discretionary reporting behavior. Including the ﬁnancial crisis years in our
sample would have confounded our results because of the diﬃculty of disentangling the eﬀects of the crisis on managerial behavior from
those of the Basel II regulatory changes. In a sensitivity check, we repeat our analysis with 2007, the year Basel II took eﬀect in the U.S.,
excluded from the sample period, and the results remain robust.
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The next section develops our hypotheses and discusses the institutional background surrounding Basel II
implementation. Section 3 describes the sample and empirical measures. Section 4 discusses the test results,
and Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1. Basel II changes
The Basel II rules have eﬀected substantial changes in the banking regulatory environment. In particular,
they impose more reﬁned risk measurement rules that aﬀect both retail banking and corporate banking. As a
result of the changes eﬀected by the 1988 Basel I Accord on the existing framework, there are several
approaches that banks can take to assess the credit risks in their loan portfolios: (1) the standardized
approach, (2) the foundation internal ratings-based (F-IRB) approach and (3) the advanced internal
ratings-based (A-IRB) approach (Basel, 2006).4 Overall, the risk sensitivity and stringency of capital calcula-
tions have increased under the Basel II rules relative to Basel I. Hence, bank operations are now under greater
regulatory pressure.
The risk assessment modiﬁcations in the Basel II Accord aﬀect the retail and corporate banking sectors
diﬀerently. Banks’ business areas generally comprise housing loans, credit cards, retail loans such as car loans,
student loans and personal loans, corporate loans, retail and corporate deposits, wealth and asset manage-
ment, and such investment banking activities as equity and bond placements and treasury trading
(Dermine, 2015). These banking activities can be broadly classiﬁed by client type. The clients of a bank’s retail
banking business are individuals and SMEs, and retail banking thus comprises housing loans, credit cards and
retail loans and deposits. The clients of its corporate banking business, in contrast, are large corporations, and
corporate banking thus involves corporate loans and deposits, wealth and asset management, investment
banking and treasury trading.
The banking literature suggests that the Basel II revisions appear to favor retail banking (Altman and
Sabato, 2005; Berger, 2004). The Basel II Accord stipulates that retail banking exposure (excluding mortgage
loans) and loans secured by residential properties using the standardized approach are risk-weighted at 75%
and 35%, respectively. Past-due loans are risk-weighted at 150% (100%) when speciﬁc provisions are less than
(no less than) 20% of the outstanding loan amount. Exposure to sovereign states, banks, public sector entities
and corporations is risk-weighted on the basis of external credit ratings in the standardized approach. For
example, the risk weights on corporate loan exposure range from 20% for borrowers rated AAA/AA to
150% for borrowers rated below BB. Under the two IRB approaches, banks must provide estimates of
the risk parameters in their risk models for retail loan exposure.5 With regard to corporate banking exposure,
the F-IRB approach requires banks to provide their own estimates of the probability of default (PD), but to
use supervisory estimates for the other risk parameters, whereas banks using the A-IRB approach must
calculate all of the risk components. The diﬀerent risk weights and risk component estimates speciﬁed in
Basel II thus lead to diﬀerential capital requirements for retail and corporate banking.
Prior research examining the eﬀect of the revised Basel II guidelines on banks is primarily concerned with
whether the rule changes exacerbate the procyclicality inherent in their lending behavior (e.g., Gordy and
Howells, 2006). Gordy and Howells (2006) ﬁnd that the changes do indeed exacerbate such procyclicality.
More speciﬁcally, the risk-sensitive capital requirements in the Basel II rules reinforce the procyclicality of
bank behavior in the following manner. As bank assets and loans are assigned higher risk weightings during
economic downturns, the capital required during those downturns increases. At the same time, capital
positions tend to deteriorate as loan losses accelerate. Such a situation induces banks to reduce lending and
4 All three approaches increase the sensitivity of capital requirements to risk assessments. However, the way in which risk is calculated
varies depending on the approach banks adopt. More speciﬁcally, the standardized approach uses standard risk buckets and risk weights
that vary by product, credit rating and collateral. In contrast, banks that apply the F-IRB or A-IRB approaches calculate credit risks
based on their internal risk models.
5 The risk parameters in these risk models are probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and exposure at default (EAD) and
maturity (EAM).
12 C.Y. Lim, K.O. Yong / China Journal of Accounting Research 10 (2017) 9–32
increase lending margins, thereby contributing to procyclicality. A recent study in the Australian regulatory
setting reports the country’s forward-looking regulatory provisions to prompt managers to use their discretion
in setting regulatory provisions to dampen the inﬂuence of credit market volatilities on lending activities
(Cummings and Durrani, 2014). However, what is left unaddressed in this stream of research is whether
the revised Basel II rules eﬀect changes in banks’ ﬁnancial reporting behavior and ﬁnancial reporting quality.
2.2. Hypothesis development
A theoretical reason for banks to engage in income smoothing is to reduce the perceived risk inherent in
banking operations because such smoothing reduces earnings variability, which in turn reduces perceived risk
(Francis et al., 2004). The revised rules under Basel II exert greater regulatory pressure on bank managers, as
the introduction of more reﬁned risk measurement stipulations imposes greater capital requirements, which
can in turn have an adverse inﬂuence on proﬁtability. As a result, we hypothesize that the rules increase
the pressure on bank managers to engage in income smoothing. In addition, for the reasons discussed earlier,
we expect the increased regulatory pressure arising from the Basel II Accord to exert diﬀerential eﬀects on the
income smoothing activities of corporate and retail banking managers.
Prior to Basel II implementation, corporate and investment banking had advantages over retail banking, as
it faced lower capital requirements. However, regulators and governments have recognized the greater risks
posed by corporate and investment banking, particularly in the wake of the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis. Hence,
greater attention is now paid to the risks associated with corporate banking, with speciﬁc capital rules imposed
on it in Basel II. To mitigate the perceived higher risks resulting from the regulatory changes, corporate
banking managers can either reduce risk-taking activities or engage in more income smoothing activities.
The corporate banking managers in weaker banks, i.e., those with a low capital adequacy ratio, face con-
straints in reducing their risk-taking activities because such activities tend to generate greater earnings, thereby
increasing the shareholder equity that constitutes part of the banks’ Tier 1 capital. Hence, these managers may
resort to greater income smoothing to mask the extent of their risk-taking activities. Corporate banking
managers in stronger banks, i.e., those with a larger capital base, have more choices: they can either reduce
risk-taking activities or engage in income smoothing to mitigate the market pressures arising from the greater
Basel II-imposed risk sensitivity. If they reduce their risk-taking activities, their actual earnings variability
declines. Consequently, these managers do not need to engage in as much income smoothing as their counter-
parts in low-capital banks. We thus hypothesize that increased regulatory pressure induces corporate banking
managers in weaker banks to increase their degree of income smoothing. Expressed in alternative form, our
ﬁrst hypothesis is as follows.
H1. Corporate banking managers in banks with low capital adequacy ratios engaged in more income
smoothing during the Basel II period.
Another important issue is whether there were changes in the timeliness of loan loss provisions during the
Basel II period. On the one hand, the Accord’s revised rules impose changes on the risk assessment framework
of banks’ loan portfolios, allowing them to more accurately assess their capital adequacy and risk positions.
As a result, banks may be in a better position to enact timelier loan loss provisions in their loan portfolios. On
the other hand, the resulting increase in regulatory pressure may induce banks to delay loan loss recognition.
Corporate banking managers, in particular, may be inclined to impose less timely loan loss provisions because
they are more adversely aﬀected by the Basel II implementation rule changes than their retail counterparts. Liu
and Ryan (1995) hypothesize that the timeliness of loan loss provisions decreases as discretion over those pro-
visions increases. As bank managers tend to have more discretion over larger loans (e.g., corporate loans) than
smaller loans (e.g., consumer loans), we predict that corporate banking managers use their discretion to
engage in less timely loan loss provisioning. More speciﬁcally, we expect a delay in the timeliness of loan loss
recognition among corporate banking managers in low-capital banks as a result of the Basel II rule changes.
Accordingly, we express our second hypothesis in alternative form as follows.
H2. Corporate banking managers in banks with low capital adequacy ratios engaged in delayed loan loss
provision recognition during the Basel II period.
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Finally, we also examine the market reaction to a series of Basel II announcements. If the Basel II rules
impose greater regulatory pressure on corporate than retail banking, then we expect a negative market reac-
tion to those announcements because the regulatory changes adversely aﬀect the capital adequacy ratios of
banks with more corporate banking than retail banking exposure. In contrast, we expect the market to react
favorably to the Basel II announcements if it anticipates the revised rules to enhance the competitiveness and
capital adequacy of the aﬀected banks. How market participants react to the series of regulatory announce-
ments concerning the Basel II changes is an empirical question. Thus, we express our third hypothesis in null
form, as follows.
H3. There is no diﬀerence in the market reaction to the Basel II announcements between banks with more
corporate banking exposure and those with more retail banking exposure.
3. Research design
Our sample comprises banks from the U.S., U.K., Europe, Canada and Australia, with data drawn from
the Bankscope database for the 1999–2007 period. For each bank, the loan losses and proﬁts before taxes are
disclosed and reported at the business segment level (i.e., retail and corporate banking) in the footnote disclo-
sures in its annual ﬁnancial reports (see Appendix A). We hand-collect the segmental information pertaining
to retail and corporate banking for each bank in our sample. The data for the other variables (i.e., non-
performing loans, change in non-performing loans, loan growth and Tier 1 capital ratios) are obtained from
Bankscope or, if unavailable, collected manually from the banks’ annual reports.
We estimate the following regression to test our ﬁrst hypothesis.
LLit ¼ a0 þ a1 Retailit þ a2 Corpit þ a3Lowcap  Retailit þ a4 Lowcap  Corpit þ a5Basel  Retailit
þ a6Basel  Corpit þ a7Basel  Lowcap  Retailit þ a8Basel  Lowcap  Corpit þ a9CAP it
þ a10NPLit1 þ a11DNPLit þ a12DLOANit þ a13Lowcapit þ eit; ð1Þ
where LL is measured as LLcorp, LLretail or the sum of the two; LLcorp (LLretail) is the corporate (retail)
banking segment’s provisions for loan losses; Retail (Corporate) is the retail (corporate) banking’s segmental
proﬁt before taxes and loan loss provisions; Lowcap is an indicator variable that equals 1 for banks with a
below-median Tier 1 capital ratio (i.e., low-capital banks), and 0 otherwise (i.e., high-capital banks); and Basel
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the bank-year observation is in the Basel II period, and 0 otherwise.
The Basel II period spans from 2003 to 2007, when the third and ﬁnal consultative paper on Basel II was
issued by the Basel Committee and consensus on the Basel II framework was achieved. A reaction to the
impending Basel II rules is expected from both the market and banks in this period.
The foregoing regression equation is adapted from those in Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) and Gebhardt and
Novotny-Farkas (2011). Similar to their equations, to control for the non-discretionary portion of loan pro-
visions, we include CAP, which is a bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio; NPL, which is its nonperforming loans at the
beginning of the year; DNPL, which is the change in nonperforming loans from the prior to current year; and
DLOAN, which is the change in total loans outstanding from the prior to current year. Thus, our regression
speciﬁcation relates the discretionary portion of corporate (retail) banking loan provisions to corporate (retail)
banking segmental proﬁts before taxes and loan provisions.
Model (1) estimates the income smoothing coeﬃcients of each combination of Corp/Retail, High-/Low-Tier
I capital ratios and Basel II/Pre-Basel II periods. In line with prior research (e.g., Kanagaretnam et al., 2004),
the baseline measures of income smoothing are a1 and a2. A positive a1 (a2) suggests that retail (corporate)
banking managers increase their loan loss provisions with an increase in proﬁts before taxes and loan provi-
sions in the pre-Basel II period. We interact our measure of loan smoothing with banks’ Tier 1 capital. In these
interaction variables, a positive a3 (a4) equates to the managers who oversee the retail (corporate) banking
business of their banks engaging in more income smoothing activities when their Tier 1 capital is below the
median Tier 1 capital ratio in our sample.
To test H1, we examine whether the coeﬃcients on BaselLowcapRetail and BaselLowcapCorp are sig-
niﬁcant and positive. A positive a7 (i.e., the coeﬃcient on BaselLowcapRetail) means that the retail banking
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managers in low-capital banks manage loan loss provisions to a greater extent to smooth pre-tax proﬁts dur-
ing the Basel II period. Similarly, a positive a8 (i.e., the coeﬃcient on BaselLowcapCorp) means that loan
loss provisions are used to a greater extent to smooth pre-tax proﬁts by corporate banking managers in
low-capital banks during the Basel II period. We thus interpret a statistically signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient
on a7 (a8) as implying that retail (corporate) banking managers in low-capital banks engaged in more income
smoothing activities in anticipation of the Basel II rule changes.
For our second hypothesis, we estimate the following regression model.
LLit ¼ a0 þ a1Retailit þ a2Corpit þ a3DNPLit þ a4DLagNPLit1 þ a5DLOANit þ a6Lowcapit þ a7Basel
þ a8Lowcapit  Baselþ a9Lowcapit  DNPLit þ a10Lowcapit  DNPLit1 þ a11Lowcapit
 DLOANit þ a12Basel  DNPLit þ a13Basel  DNPLit1 þ a14Basel  DLOANit þ a15Lowcapit
 Basel  DNPLit þ a16Lowcapit  Basel  DLagNPLit1 þ a17Lowcapit  Basel  DLOANit þ eit: ð2Þ
Model (2), which is adapted from Beatty and Liao (2011), relates current LL to current and prior changes
in NPL for each combination of Corp/Retail, High-/Low-Tier I capital ratios and Basel II/Pre-Basel II peri-
ods, where LL is measured as either LLcorp or LLretail, as deﬁned in Eq. (1). This model also includes
DLOAN and Lowcap as control variables. The coeﬃcients of interest are those on DNPL and DLagNPL.
These coeﬃcients measure the timeliness of loan loss recognition, with a positive coeﬃcient indicating that
loan loss provisions reﬂect the change in non-performing loans in a timelier manner.
H2 posits a delay in the timeliness of loan loss provisioning in the Basel II period for corporate banking
managers in low-capital banks. Our baseline measurement variables are a1 and a2, which are the coeﬃcients
on DNPL and DLagNPL. These measures of the timeliness of loan loss provisions are based on the measures
in Beatty and Liao (2011) and Bushman and Williams (2012). A positive a3 and a4 demonstrate that these
provisions capture the increase in the timeliness of non-performing loan recognition in the pre-Basel period.
Because we are interested in the extent of that timeliness in the Basel II period, our variables of interest are
a15 and a16 (i.e., the coeﬃcients on LowcapBaselDNPL and LowcapBaselDLagNPL). Negative values
mean that the loan loss provisions capture the change in non-performing loans in the Basel II period in a
less timely fashion, indicating that banks delayed loan loss recognition in response to greater regulatory
pressure.
For our third hypothesis, we identify 19 events associated with Basel II implementation. Events 1 to 6
cover the period from 1999 to 2002, which encompasses the conceptualization of the Basel II Accord, release
of detailed information on the Basel II rule changes (in the second consultative paper) and achievement of
general consensus on the major implementation issues concerning the rules. News articles during this period
generally indicate that banks would likely be badly hit by the stringent and restrictive Basel II rules, which
would be costly to implement. The revised capital requirements, in particular, were viewed as tougher and
thus likely to exert more pressure on certain businesses. For example, it was felt that bank loans to SMEs
and derivative activities would be adversely aﬀected. Events 7 to 12 cover the period from October 2002 to
May 2004, during which the Basel Committee carried out a comprehensive ﬁeld test on its proposals, issued
and obtained public feedback on a third consultation paper, and took decisions on key issues and achieved
consensus on the remaining issues. Finally, Events 13 to 19 took place between June 2004 and May 2006.
This period saw further reﬁnements of the trading exposure rules, additional quantitative impact studies
and evaluation of the IFRS eﬀects on the capital rules concerning implementation of the standardized
approach.
Our tests are based on the banks’ three-day cumulative abnormal returns centered on each of the 19 event
dates: CARj,e, where j denotes ﬁrm and e denotes event. The expected stock return for each bank on each event
date is the bank’s average stock return one month before the event date. The abnormal return for each bank is
its raw stock return less its expected return. The return data from 1999 to 2006 are computed on the basis of
total return indices from Datastream. Finally, t-tests are run to compare abnormal returns on each event date
for the two bank sub-samples. More speciﬁcally, we compare the diﬀerences in the market reactions for banks’
retail and corporate banking businesses and for low- and high-capital banks.
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4. Results
4.1. Main results
Panel A of Table 1 presents the distribution of our sample ﬁrms by year and country, and Panel B the
descriptive statistics of our key variables. Three hundred and eighty-six observations are from U.S. banks,
and 316 from non-U.S. banks. The sample is evenly distributed across the sample period, with a gradual
increase in the number of bank-year observations throughout. As shown in Panel B, loan losses and proﬁts
before taxes and loan losses are generally higher in the retail banking segment than in the corporate banking
Table 1
Sample composition. This table describes our sample ﬁrms. Panel A reports the sample distribution by
country and year. Panel B provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our regression
analyses. LLretail is retail loan losses scaled by prior-year market capitalization; LLcorp is corporate loan
losses scaled by prior-year market capitalization; Retail is retail banking segmental proﬁt before taxes and
excluding loan losses scaled by prior-year market capitalization; Corp is corporate banking segmental
proﬁt before taxes and excluding loan losses scaled by prior-year market capitalization; CAP is Tier 1
capital ratio, as deﬁned by the Basel rules; NPL is non-performing loans in the prior year scaled by market
capitalization; DNPL is a change in non-performing loans from the prior year to current year scaled by
market capitalization; Basel is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for 2003–2007, and to 0 otherwise;
Basel0304 is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for 2003–2004, and to 0 otherwise; Basel0507 is an
indicator variable that is equal to 1 for 2005–2007, and to 0 otherwise; and Lowcap is an indicator variable
for bank-year observations with a Tier 1 capital ratio below the median capital ratio, and 0 otherwise.
Total Total
Panel A: Sample distribution
USA 386 2000 55
Canada 66 2001 65
U.K. 32 2002 70
Australia 28 2003 77
France 12 2004 88
Germany 21 2005 106
Switzerland 22 2006 113
The Netherlands 4 2007 128
Italy 20
Spain 26
Sweden 10
Norway 13
Belgium 7
Ireland 16
Finland 5
Denmark 10
Austria 13
Greece 11
Total 702 Total 702
Obs Mean Std Dev Median Min Max
Panel B: Descriptive statistics
LLretail 702 0.014 0.019 0.010 0.106 0.166
LLcorp 702 0.006 0.014 0.000 0.008 0.133
Retail 702 0.083 0.061 0.084 0.000 0.498
Corp 702 0.054 0.060 0.043 0.059 0.388
CAP 702 0.107 0.075 0.094 0.051 0.920
NPL 702 0.071 0.152 0.024 0.000 2.008
DNPL 702 0.007 0.091 0.000 1.425 0.841
DLoan 702 0.132 1.988 0.000 12.664 13.314
Basel 702 0.729 0.445 0.000 0.000 1.000
Basel0304 702 0.235 0.424 0.000 0.000 1.000
Basel0507 702 0.494 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
Lowcap 702 0.499 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
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segment. More speciﬁcally, the mean (median) value of LLretail is 0.014 (0.010), whereas that of LLcorp is
0.006 (0.000). In terms of proﬁtability, the mean (median) value of Retail is 0.083 (0.084), whereas that of Corp
is 0.054 (0.043). The percentages of mean retail and corporate banking loan losses and mean non-performing
loans are 2% and 7.1%, respectively. These measures are scaled by the beginning market value of equity.
Table 2 shows the Spearman correlation matrix. The negative correlations between Retail and LLretail
(Corp and LLcorp) provide evidence indicating that banks use retail (corporate) banking loan losses to smooth
their retail (corporate) banking segmental income. At the business segment level, the negative correlation
between Retail and Corp suggests that banks tend to focus on either retail or corporate banking. That between
NPL and DNPL suggests that the higher the number of non-performing loans in the prior period, the likelier it
is that banks are able to reduce the number of such loans in the subsequent period. Finally, the positive cor-
relation between DLoan and DNPL shows that greater loan growth leads to an increase in non-performing
loans. These results are generally consistent with the empirical evidence in Salas and Saurina (2002).
Table 3 reports the results of our regression analyses examining the eﬀects of income smoothing during the
Basel II period using retail and corporate loan losses. The ﬁrst column presents the results of regressing LL on
our variables of interest. The coeﬃcient of our key variable, BaselLowcapCorp (0.2244), is positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. We interpret this result as suggesting that the extent of income smoothing
is greater for corporate banking than for retail banking among weaker banks in the Basel II period. An F-test
comparing the extent of income smoothing in the retail banking segment of weak banks [(a1 + a3 + a5 + a7) 
(a1 + a3)] against that in the corporate banking segment of weak banks [(a2 + a4 + a6 + a8)  (a2 + a4)]
suggests a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence (a5 + a7  a6 + a8 < 0) during the Basel II period relative to the
pre-Basel period. The diﬀerence (0.1783, p = 0.068) is statistically diﬀerent at the 0.10 level.
In the second and third columns of Table 3, we regress LLretail and LLcorp separately. The positive coef-
ﬁcients of Retail (in the column with dependent variable LLretail) and Corp (in the column with dependent
variable LLcorp) show that income smoothing using loan loss provisions occurs in both retail banking and
corporate banking. In the LLcorp column, the coeﬃcient of LowcapCorp is negative, indicating that corpo-
rate banking managers in weaker banks with low capital adequacy ratios smoothed their income to a lesser
extent prior to the Basel II period. This result suggests that there was less regulatory pressure on corporate
banking before Basel II. The coeﬃcient of BaselCorp is also negative, indicating that the corporate banking
business of high-capital banks faced less regulatory pressure during the Basel II period. The coeﬃcient of our
key variable, BaselLowcapCorp (0.2183), is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. Consistent
with our ﬁrst hypothesis, this result suggests that during the Basel II period, corporate banking managers in
weaker banks with low capital adequacy ratios faced more regulatory pressure. Consequently, they smoothed
income to a greater extent than their counterparts in stronger banks during that period. An F-test also shows
the extent of income smoothing for the corporate banking segment to have increased (0.1323, p = 0.023)
among the weaker banks during the Basel II period relative to the pre-Basel period. This result is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. Overall, these results support our ﬁrst hypothesis that corporate banking managers
Table 2
Correlation Matrix. This table presents the correlations among the variables used in the empirical analyses. Pearson (Spearman)
correlations are presented above (below) the diagonal. The variables are deﬁned in Table 1. Correlations in bold are statistically signiﬁcant
at the 0.01 level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
LLretail (1) 1.000
LLcorp (2) 0.09 1.000
Retail (3) 0.47 0.12 1.000
Corp (4) 0.05 0.38 0.31 1.000
Cap (5) 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.05 1.000
NPL (6) 0.18 0.29 0.01 0.24 0.11 1.000
DNPL (7) 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.55 1.000
DLoan (8) 0.17 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.28 0.40 1.000
Basel0304 (9) 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 1.000
Basel0507 (10) 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.55 1.000
Basel (11) 0.13 0.21 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.34 0.60 1.000
Lowcap (12) 0.14 0.17 0.02 0.22 0.38 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.01 1.000
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Table 3
Regression Analyses: Basel II (2003–2007) and Income Smoothing. This table reports the results of our regressions examining the eﬀects of
income smoothing during the Basel II period using retail and corporate loan losses obtained from the segmental results of banks’ footnote
disclosures. The variables are deﬁned in Table 1. p-values are reported in parentheses.
LL LLretail LLcorp
Panel A: Multivariate analysis
Retail a1 0.1015
*** 0.1260*** 0.0245**
(0.009) (0.001) (0.033)
Corp a2 0.1507
*** 0.0018 0.1489***
(0.008) (0.967) (0.000)
LowcapRetail a3 0.0226 0.0142 0.0368
(0.745) (0.788) (0.396)
LowcapCorp a4 0.2293*** 0.0552 0.1741***
(0.010) (0.436) (0.006)
BaselRetail a5 0.0583 0.0445 0.0139
(0.315) (0.386) (0.526)
BaselCorp a6 0.0416 0.0444 0.0860**
(0.519) (0.368) (0.029)
BaselLowcapRetail a7 0.0538 0.0331 0.0207
(0.545) (0.642) (0.688)
BaselLowcapCorp a8 0.2244** 0.0061 0.2183***
(0.024) (0.935) (0.002)
Cap a9 0.653* 0.0388 0.0265***
(0.067) (0.222) (0.007)
NPL a10 0.1779
*** 0.0952** 0.0827***
(0.002) (0.021) (0.010)
DNPL a11 0.1345 0.0824 0.0521
(0.214) (0.333) (0.135)
DLoan a12 0.0017 0.0014 0.0003
(0.136) (0.197) (0.252)
Lowcap a13 0.0483* 0.0358* 0.0126
(0.077) (0.063) (0.485)
Basel a14 0.0090 0.0103 0.0012
(0.349) (0.238) (0.752)
Year eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Country eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 702 702 702
Adjusted R-square 0.4054 0.3732 0.3384
LL LLretail LLcorp
Panel B: Hypothesis testing (F-test)
Retail versus corporate banking
High-capital banks: 0.0999
a5  a6 < 0 (0.073)
Low-capital banks: 0.1783
a5 + a7  a6  a8 < 0 (0.068)
Low-capital banks (retail banking)
Overall eﬀect (Basel II period): 0.1232
a1 + a3 + a5 + a7 > 0 (0.000)
Basel II period – Pre-Basel period: 0.0114
a5 + a7 > 0 (0.821)
Low-capital banks (corporate banking)
Overall eﬀect (Basel II period): 0.1071
a2 + a4 + a6 + a8 > 0 (0.000)
Basel II period – Pre-Basel period: 0.1323
a6 + a8 > 0 (0.023)
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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in low-capital (high-capital) banks engaged in more (less) income smoothing activities during the Basel II
period. In contrast, we document no diﬀerential eﬀect in relation to income smoothing for the retail banking
segment during that period.
Table 4 reports the results of a regression comparing time-series diﬀerences in income smoothing trends
during the Basel II period. We partition our sample observations into two periods: the early Basel II period
(2003–2004) and late Basel II period (2005–2007). The positive (negative) and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
cient of the key variable, Basel0507LowcapCorp (Basel0507Corp), is present in the late Basel II period
(Table 4, Panel B), but not in the early period (Table 4, Panel A), which suggests that corporate banking man-
agers in low-capital (high-capital) banks engaged in more (less) income smoothing in the former period.
We also run several F-tests to validate our inferences. Consistent with the foregoing result, we ﬁnd that the
F-test diﬀerence between retail and corporate banking for low-capital banks during the early Basel II period is
not statistically signiﬁcant (0.0202, p = 0.755), whereas that for low-capital banks is (0.115, p = 0.10).
Thus, we document evidence suggesting that corporate banking managers intensiﬁed their income smoothing
activities in the latter part of our sample period.
Table 5 reports the results of regressions examining the timeliness of loan loss provisions for corporate and
retail banking during the latter part of the Basel II period (i.e., 2005–2007). When the dependent variable is
LLcorp, the key coeﬃcient of LowcapBasel0507DNPL is negative and statistically signiﬁcant (0.082,
p = 0.084), which suggests that corporate banking loan loss provisions capture the change in non-
performing loans on a less timely basis in the late Basel II period. We document no eﬀect for the timeliness
of such provisions for retail banking throughout the sample period. In robustness tests, we remove European
banks from the sample, as IFRS came into eﬀect in Europe in 2005, but the key results remain unchanged.
Overall, our ﬁndings provide some evidence in support of our second hypothesis that corporate banking
managers in low-capital banks provided less timely loan loss provisions during the Basel II period.
For the dependent variable LLcorp, the coeﬃcient of LowcapDNPL (0.084. p = 0.054) is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant, which indicates that, prior to the Basel II period, corporate banking managers in
low-capital banks exhibited greater timeliness than their counterparts in high-capital banks in recognizing
loan loss provisions. However, there are fewer corporate banking loan loss provisions in the Basel II than
in pre-Basel II period, particularly for low-capital banks. More speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient of
LowcapBasel0507 (0.004, p = 0.049) is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. Consistent with
our prediction that retail banking has been relatively less aﬀected by the regulatory changes, we ﬁnd the
foregoing results to lose their statistical signiﬁcance when the dependent variable is LLretail.
4.2. Enforcement tests
Tables 6 and 7 report the results of additional cross-sectional tests in which the sample is partitioned
between banks located in countries with more and less stringent banking enforcement based on Barth et al.
(2013), which reports the results of surveys carried out by the authors with sponsorship from the World Bank.
We are speciﬁcally interested in the survey responses ‘‘Yes,” ‘‘No” or ‘‘N/A” to three questions: ‘‘If an
infraction of any prudential regulation is found in the course of supervision, must it be reported?” ‘‘Are there
mandatory actions that the supervisor must take in these cases?” and ‘‘Are supervisors legally liable for their
actions?” When the answer to at least two of these questions is ‘‘Yes,” we classify banks located in the coun-
tries in question as being located in countries with strict enforcement, with the remaining banks classiﬁed as
being in countries with less strict enforcement.
Table 6 reports the results of income smoothing tests on the partitioned sample. The objective of these tests
was to determine whether our results vary across the two types of banking enforcement regime. Our expecta-
tion is that banks located in countries with strict such enforcement are under greater regulatory pressure than
their counterparts in countries with lax banking regulations, and thus the results for the latter should be
weaker and less signiﬁcant.
Consistent with that expectation, we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant result at the 0.01 level for the coeﬃcient
of our key variable, BaselLowcapCorp (0.2161, p = 0.005), among banks subject to strict banking
regulations, whereas no such result is found for the other banks (0.0118, p = 0.937). Overall, these results sug-
gest that the incentives to smooth income in response to the Basel II rule changes are concentrated among
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Table 4
Regression Analyses: Early (2003–2004) and Late Periods (2005–2007) of Basel II and Income Smoothing. This table reports the results of
our regressions examining the eﬀects of income smoothing in the early and late Basel II period using retail and corporate loan losses. The
variables are deﬁned in Table 1. p-values are reported in parentheses.
LL LLretail LLcorp
Panel A: Early Basel II period
Retail a1 0.1081
*** 0.1467*** 0.0386**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Corp a2 0.0975
*** 0.0328 0.0646***
(0.001) (0.105) (0.000)
LowcapRetail a3 0.0254 0.0341 0.0087
(0.604) (0.381) (0.716)
LowcapCorp a4 0.0616*** 0.0584* 0.0032
(0.226) (0.064) (0.928)
Base0304Retail a5 0.0360 0.0200 0.0560**
(0.468) (0.580) (0.041)
Basel0304Corp a6 0.0208 0.0119 0.0327
(0.681) (0.660) (0.469)
Basel0304LowcapRetail a7 0.0266 0.0246 0.0512
(0.721) (0.668) (0.240)
Basel0304LowcapCorp a8 0.0620 0.0291 0.0329
(0.402) (0.521) (0.581)
Cap a9 0.0204** 0.0078 0.0126***
(0.021) (0.220) (0.002)
NPL a10 0.1179
*** 0.0833*** 0.00346*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.072)
DNPL a11 0.1278 0.0908 0.0370
(0.109) (0.144) (0.192)
DLoan a12 0.0014 0.0012 0.0002
(0.176) (0.197) (0.498)
Lowcap a13 0.0060 0.0018 0.0042
(0.715) (0.887) (0.646)
Basel0304 a14 0.0127 0.0012 0.0115***
(0.715) (0.812) (0.003)
Year eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Country eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 702 702 702
Adjusted R-square 0.3738 0.3686 0.3064
LL LLretail LLcorp
Panel B: Late Basel II period
Retail a1 0.1051
*** 0.1271*** 0.0220**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.031)
Corp a2 0.1270
*** 0.0172 0.1098***
(0.000) (0.483) (0.000)
LowcapRetail a3 0.0020 0.0395 0.0415
(0.968) (0.364) (0.1440)
LowcapCorp a4 0.1282** 0.0547 0.0735*
(0.020) (0.185) (0.082)
Base0507Retail a5 0.0662 0.0690 0.0028
(0.351) (0.254) (0.916)
Basel0507Corp a6 0.0354 0.0393 0.0747**
(0.482) (0.288) (0.019)
Basel0507LowcapRetail a7 0.0940 0.0343 0.0597
(0.314) (0.664) (0.161)
Basel0507LowcapCorp a8 0.1226 0.0087 0.1314**
(0.121) (0.867) (0.026)
Cap a9 0.0282* 0.0155 0.0128**
(0.060) (0.202) (0.033)
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banks located in countries with a strong banking enforcement regime.6 Corporate banking managers in these
countries presumably experience greater regulatory pressure than their counterparts in less stringent regimes.
NPL a10 0.1650
*** 0.0964*** 0.0686***
(0.001) (0.010) (0.002)
DNPL a11 0.1447 0.0940 0.0507
(0.219) (0.298) (0.193)
DLoan a12 0.0015 0.0012 0.0003
(0.179) (0.243) (0.326)
Lowcap a13 0.0414** 0.0317** 0.0097
(0.033) (0.022) (0.449)
Basel0507 a14 0.0089 0.0092 0.0003
(0.241) (0.146) (0.939)
Year eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Country eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 702 702 702
Adjusted R-square 0.3918 0.3739 0.3222
LL LLretail LLcorp
Panel C: Hypothesis testing (F-test)
Early Basel II period:
Retail versus corporate banking
High-capital banks: 0.0152
a5  a6 < 0 (0.692)
Low-capital banks: 0.0202
a5 + a7  a6  a8 < 0 (0.755)
Low-capital banks (retail banking)
Overall eﬀect (Basel II period): 0.0680
a1 + a3 + a5 + a7 > 0 (0.070)
Basel II period – Pre-Basel period: 0.0446
a5 + a7 > 0 (0.322)
Low-capital banks (corporate banking)
Overall eﬀect (Basel II period): 0.1270
a2 + a4 + a6 + a8 > 0 (0.000)
Basel II period – Pre-Basel period: 0.0656
a6 + a8 > 0 (0.092)
Late Basel II period:
Retail versus corporate banking
High-capital banks: 0.1016
a5  a6 < 0 (0.049)
Low-capital banks: 0.1150
a5 + a7  a6  a8 < 0 (0.101)
Low-capital banks (retail banking)
Overall eﬀect (Basel II period): 0.1223
a1 + a3 + a5 + a7 > 0 (0.002)
Basel II period – Pre-Basel period: 0.0347
a5 + a7 > 0 (0.492)
Low-capital banks (corporate banking)
Overall eﬀect (Basel II period): 0.0930
a2 + a4 + a6 + a8 > 0 (0.013)
Basel II period – Pre-Basel period: 0.0567
a6 + a8 > 0 (0.249)
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
6 In countries with strong banking enforcement, increased regulatory pressure can induce bank managers to engage in income smoothing
because the bank regulators are primarily interested in ensuring that their banks are well-regulated and well-capitalized. They are less
concerned with income smoothing and other forms of accounting manipulation, which are under the purview of accounting standard setters.
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Finally, Table 7 reports the test results on the timeliness of corporate loan loss provisions after partitioning
the sample by enforcement regime. Only in countries with laxer banking enforcement are low-capital banks
less timely in recognizing corporate loan loss provisions in the Basel II period, as reﬂected in the negative
and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of LowcapBasel0507DNPL (0.6442, p = 0.001). Stricter bank regu-
lators monitor the timeliness of loan loss provisions more closely than their less strict counterparts (Costello
et al., 2016). Thus, the managers of low-capital banks in strict enforcement regimes enjoy less discretion to
manage such timeliness under the Basel II rules even though they are under considerable pressure to do so.
It thus appears that the timeliness of loan loss provision eﬀect is concentrated in less stringent enforcement
regimes, where corporate banking managers in low-capital banks have more discretion with respect to the tim-
ing of corporate loan loss recognition.
Table 5
Regression Analyses: Timeliness of Loan Loss Provisions. This table reports the
results of our regressions examining the timeliness of loan loss provisions. All
variables are deﬁned in Table 1. p-values are reported in parentheses.
LLretail LLcorp
Retail 0.1476*** 0.0211**
(0.000) (0.035)
Corp 0.0262 0.0527**
(0.152) (0.012)
DNPL 0.0278 0.0485
(0.673) (0.179)
DLagNPL 0.0197 0.0068
(0.538) (0.685)
DLoan 0.0012 0.0006
(0.393) (0.143)
Lowcap 0.0043 0.0036*
(0.123) (0.061)
Basel0507 0.0034 0.0111***
(0.168) (0.000)
LowcapBasel0507 0.0016 0.0040**
(0.608) (0.049)
LowcapDNPL 0.0072 0.0840*
(0.928) (0.054)
LowcapDLagNPL 0.0702 0.0008
(0.116) (0.968)
LowcapDLoan 0.0011 0.0019
(0.664) (0.233)
Basel0507DNPL 0.0536 0.0572
(0.459) (0.167)
Basel0507DLagNPL 0.0083 0.0124
(0.813) (0.467)
Basel0507DLoan 0.0004 0.0002
(0.835) (0.835)
LowcapBasel0507DNPL 0.0541 0.0820*
(0.520) (0.084)
LowcapBasel0507DLagNPL 0.0714 0.0197
(0.135) (0.437)
LowcapBasel0507DLoan 0.0030 0.0016
(0.301) (0.420)
Year eﬀects Yes Yes
Country eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations 566 566
Adjusted R-square 0.3193 0.2429
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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4.3. Market reaction tests
Table 8 reports the market reactions to important announcements regarding changes to the Basel II rules. It
can be seen that the market reactions to Events 1 to 12 are more negative for banks with greater corporate
banking exposure than retail banking exposure, particularly for three of those events: (1) 13 December
2001 (Event 5: 2.96%) when the Basel Committee’s quantitative impact studies suggested that the revised
Basel II Accord would be able to meet the Committee’s objectives; (2) 10 July 2002 (Event 6: 2.68%) when
the Basel Committee reached agreement on a number of important issues related to Basel II implementation;
and (3) 11 May 2004 (Event 12: 0.84%) when the Committee announced that it had achieved consensus on
the remaining issues and would publish the text of the Basel II Accord at the end of June 2004. Overall, our
test results suggest that in the period spanned by those events the market perceived the eﬀects of the Basel II
regulatory changes to have more negative implications for corporate banking than retail banking because the
new rules imposed more stringent capital requirements on market risks, which aﬀect corporate and investment
banking to a greater extent than retail banking.
Table 6
Regression Analyses: Income Smoothing and Enforcement. This table reports the
results of our regressions examining the eﬀects of income smoothing during the Basel
II period between banks located in countries with strict versus less strict enforcement
regimes. All variables are deﬁned in Table 1. p-values are reported in parentheses.
Dependent: LLcorp Strict Non-Strict
Retail 0.0213* 0.1303
(0.078) (0.314)
Corp 0.1589*** 0.1051
(0.000) (0.120)
LowcapRetail 0.0147 0.1194
(0.737) (0.407)
LowcapCorp 0.1110* 0.0389
(0.089) (0.764)
BaselRetail 0.0025 0.1019
(0.915) (0.434)
BaselCorp 0.1291*** 0.1825*
(0.001) (0.055)
BaselLowcapRetail 0.0235 0.0885
(0.665) (0.558)
BaselLowcapCorp 0.2161*** 0.0118
(0.005) (0.937)
Cap 0.0230*** 3.2112***
(0.006) (0.003)
NPL 0.0739** 0.5958***
(0.020) (0.000)
DNPL 0.0424 0.0924
(0.181) (0.226)
DLoan 0.0002 0.0111***
(0.468) (0.000)
Lowcap 0.0147 0.4565***
(0.232) (0.011)
Basel 0.0027 0.3499**
(0.481) (0.013)
Year eﬀects Yes Yes
Country eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations 545 157
Adjusted R-square 0.3805 0.5755
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
C.Y. Lim, K.O. Yong /China Journal of Accounting Research 10 (2017) 9–32 23
Conversely, we ﬁnd that the market reactions to Events 13 to 19 are more positive for banks with more
corporate than retail banking exposure. The positive market reaction to these banks is especially large on
24 May 2006 (Event 19: 2.88%), the date on which the results of a quantitative impact study were released
for G10 countries showing that the minimum capital required under Pillar 1 of the Basel II framework would
decrease relative to the Basel I framework. The market appears to have been relieved that the consequences for
corporate banking of the Basel II rules would be less negative than originally feared. The positive market reac-
tion also corresponds with greater income smoothing using corporate loan losses and more active lobbying by
various regulators and industry groups to minimize the adverse eﬀects of the Basel II regulatory changes.7 In
7 The regulators engaged in lobbying included the Oﬃce of the Comptroller of the Currency, the top regulator of national banks in the
U.S., U.S. Senate banking committee members, the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the U.K. Financial Services Authority
and the China Banking Regulatory Commission. The industry groups included the Securities Industry Association, British Bankers
Association, European Banking Association, French Banking Federation and banking industry bodies such as the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association, Institute of International Finance, European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association.
Table 7
Regression Analyses: Timeliness of Loan Loss Provisions and Enforcement. This table
reports the results of our regressions examining the timeliness of loan loss provisions
in banks located in countries with strict versus less strict enforcement regimes. All
variables are deﬁned in Table 1. p-values are reported in parentheses.
Dependent: LLcorp Strict Non-Strict
DNPL 0.0131 0.1805
(0.723) (0.146)
DLagNPL 0.0152 0.0745
(0.268) (0.458)
DLoan 0.0001 0.0036
(0.725) (0.258)
Lowcap 0.0038** 0.0019
(0.034) (0.835)
Basel0507 0.0063**
(0.020)
LowcapBasel0507 0.0024 0.0050
(0.237) (0.589)
LowcapDNPL 0.0262 0.6651***
(0.497) (0.001)
LowcapDLagNPL 0.0076 0.0096
(0.715) (0.931)
LowcapDLoan 0.0004 0.0124***
(0.549) (0.002)
Basel0507DNPL 0.0415 0.1763
(0.363) (0.162)
Basel0507DLagNPL 0.0288** 0.0720
(0.041) (0.480)
Basel0507DLoan 0.0013 0.0032
(0.278) (0.408)
LowcapBasel0507DNPL 0.0358 0.6442***
(0.476) (0.001)
LowcapBasel0507DLagNPL 0.0247 0.0100
(0.389) (0.929)
LowcapBasel0507DLoan 0.0016 0.0114**
(0.303) (0.014)
Year eﬀects Yes Yes
Country eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations 441 125
Adjusted R-square 0.1787 0.4642
 Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, level.
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Table 8
Market Reaction to Basel II Announcements. This table reports the results of the market reaction to signiﬁcant Basel II announcements. Figures in bold are statistically signiﬁcant
at the 0.10 level.
Press release
date (Event
no.)
Event description Overall Mean
CAR (t stat/p
value) (n = obs)
High Tier1 cap
group CAR (t stat/
p value) (n = obs)
Low Tier1 cap
group CAR
(t stat/p value)
(n = obs)
Retail group
CAR (t stat/p
value)
(n = obs)
Corporate group
CAR (t stat/p
value) (n = obs)
3 June 1999
(1)
The Basel Committee issued a consultative paper on a new
capital adequacy framework consisting of three pillars:
minimum capital requirements, which expand on the
standardized rules in the 1988 Accord; supervisory review of an
institution’s capital adequacy and internal assessment process;
and eﬀective use of market discipline to strengthen disclosure
and encourage sound banking practices
0.0049
(2.30/0.022)
(n = 199)
0.0000
(0.00/0.999)
(n = 38)
0.0047
(0.97/0.339)
(n = 38)
0.0053
(1.17/0.248)
(n = 61)
0.0050
(1.27/0.209)
(n = 62)
(1) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)a
(0.54/0.588) (0.04/0.970)
15 Dec 1999
(2)
The Basel Committee issued a paper providing detailed
guidance on what disclosures should be made to the market,
which was designed to strengthen the third pillar of the
consultative paper issued in June 1999
0.0156
(3.92/0.000)
(n = 201)
0.0028
(0.36/0.722)
(n = 38)
0.0197
(4.12/0.000)
(n = 39)
0.0116
(2.39/0.020)
(n = 62)
0.0105
(1.80/0.076)
(n = 63)
(2) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(1.83/0.071) (0.15/0.880)
18 Jan 2000
(3)
The Basel Committee issued two supplementary papers: A New
Capital Adequacy Framework: Pillar Three, Market Discipline
proposes guidelines for bank disclosures, and the Range of
Practice in Banks’ Internal Rating Systems assesses the current
state of practice in banks’ internal rating systems and processes
0.0127
(4.61/0.000)
(n = 202)
0.0052
(0.67/0.510)
(n = 38)
0.0280 (4.60/
0.000) (n = 39)
0.0084
(1.32/0.190)
(n = 62)
0.0185
(4.55/0.000)
(n = 63)
(3) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(3.37/0.001) (1.35/0.180)
16 Jan 2001
(4)
The Basel Committee issued a second consultative proposal
based on three pillars: minimum capital requirements, reﬁning
the framework in Basel 1; the supervisory review of a bank’s
capital adequacy; and market discipline, through eﬀective
disclosure to encourage safe and sound banking practices
0.0062
(3.42/0.001)
(n = 206)
0.0073
(1.60/0.117)
(n = 39)
0.0003
(0.07/0.941)
(n = 39)
0.0015
(0.44/0.659)
(n = 63)
0.0115
(3.07/0.003)
(n = 65)
(4) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(1.26/0.212) (1.99/0.049)
13 Dec 2001
(5)
The Committee reviewed its progress toward the completion of
a new Basel Capital Accord, noting that the direction of its
proposed modiﬁcations to the revised Accord had been well
received and that its quantitative impact studies suggested the
revised Accord was now closer to meeting its objectives
0.0202
(10.16/0.000)
(n = 207)
0.0096
(3.23/0.003)
(n = 39)
0.0225
(4.63/0.000)
(n = 39)
0.0120
(3.50/0.001)
(n = 63)
0.0296
(10.95/0.000)
(n = 65)
(5) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(2.27/0.026) (4.07/0.000)
(continued on next page)
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Table 8 (continued)
Press release
date (Event
no.)
Event description Overall Mean
CAR (t stat/p
value) (n = obs)
High Tier1 cap
group CAR (t stat/
p value) (n = obs)
Low Tier1 cap
group CAR
(t stat/p value)
(n = obs)
Retail group
CAR (t stat/p
value)
(n = obs)
Corporate group
CAR (t stat/p
value) (n = obs)
10 July 2002
(6)
The Basel Committee reached agreement on a number of
important issues related to the new Basel Capital Accord. It
also approved the creation of a new IRB risk-weight curve to
provide more risk-sensitive treatment of certain revolving retail
exposures, including many credit card exposures
0.0196
(10.31/0.000)
(n = 209)
0.0181
(4.53/0.000)
(n = 39)
0.0174
(4.36/0.000)
(n = 39)
0.0159
(5.04/0.000)
(n = 64)
0.0268
(8.04/0.000)
(n = 65)
(6) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(0.11/0.914) (2.37/0.019)
1 Oct 2002
(7)
The Basel Committee launched a comprehensive ﬁeld test of its
proposals for banks. The test, which is referred to as the third
quantitative impact survey, or QIS 3, focused on the Pillar 1 of
Basel II. It was undertaken with the goals of ensuring the
eﬃcacy of the Basel Committee’s proposals and gathering
information to assess whether further modiﬁcations were
necessary prior to the release of a formal package for
consultation in the spring of 2003
0.0042
(1.68/0.094)
(n = 211)
0.0118
(2.82/0.008)
(n = 39)
0.0072
(1.39/0.172)
(n = 39)
0.0126
(3.98/0.000)
(n = 64)
0.0048
(1.21/0.230)
(n = 65)
(7) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(0.70/0.486) (1.53/0.128)
29 April
2003 (8)
The Basel Committee issued to banks and all other interested
parties a third consultative paper on Basel II, with comments
due by 31 July 2003. The Committee said it would make ﬁnal
modiﬁcations to its proposal and aim to complete the new
accord by the fourth quarter of 2003, with implementation to
take eﬀect in member countries by year-end 2006. Work was
begun in a number of countries on draft rules that would
integrate Basel capital standards with national capital regimes
0.0075
(4.35/0.000)
(n = 212)
0.0101
(3.34/0.002)
(n = 39)
0.0120
(2.76/0.009)
(n = 39)
0.0103
(3.72/0.000)
(n = 64)
0.0048
(1.51/0.135)
(n = 65)
(8) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(0.37/0.714) (1.30/0.197)
18 Aug 2003
(9)
The Basel Committee published a report entitled ‘‘High-level
Principles for the Cross-border Implementation of the New
Accord.” As the Committee moved toward the completion of
Basel II, this interim publication highlighted the work of the
Accord Implementation Group (AIG) in developing a set of
principles to facilitate closer, practical cooperation and
information exchange among supervisors
0.0104
(6.95/0.000)
(n = 213)
0.0185
(5.11/0.000)
(n = 39)
0.0047
(1.61/0.116)
(n = 39)
0.0133 (4.59/
0.000) (n = 64)
0.0100
(3.27/0.002)
(n = 65)
(9) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(2.98/0.004) (0.79/0.431)
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11 Oct 2003
(10)
The Basel Committee met to decide on responses to public
comments received on Basel II and to deliberate the next steps.
The Committee received over 200 comments on its third
consultative paper, indicating broad support for the new accord
and agreement on the need to adopt a more risk-sensitive capital
framework. Committee members committed to work promptly
to resolve the outstanding issues by no later than mid-year 2004
0.0059
(5.95/0.000)
(n = 213)
0.0103
(4.86/0.000)
(n = 39)
0.0035
(1.84/0.074)
(n = 39)
0.0080
(4.26/0.000)
(n = 64)
0.0089
(5.47/0.000)
(n = 65)
(10) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(2.42/0.018) (0.36/0.719)
15 Jan 2004
(11)
The Basel Committee reviewed the progress made on
outstanding matters to meet its mid-year 2004 objective and
took decisions on key issues. It decided on modiﬁcations to
implement the proposal made in October and said it would
publish them shortly. The Committee agreed with industry
comments that the cap on the recognition of excess provisions
should not be based on Tier 2 capital components. Instead, it
was decided to convert the cap to a to-be-determined
percentage of credit risk-weighted assets
0.0135
(8.25/0.000)
(n = 213)
0.0139
(3.82/0.000)
(n = 39)
0.0192
(4.82/0.000)
(n = 39)
0.0138
(4.24/0.000)
(n = 64)
0.0165
(5.85/0.000)
(n = 65)
(11) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(0.98/0.331) (0.64/0.521)
11 May
2004 (12)
The Basel Committee announced that it had achieved
consensus on the remaining issues and would publish the text of
Basel II at the end of June 2004. That text would serve as the
basis for national rule-making and for banks to complete their
preparations for Basel II implementation
0.0006
(0.31/0.760)
(n = 216)
0.0067
(1.67/0.103)
(n = 39)
0.0023
(0.55/0.584)
(n = 39)
0.0092
(2.91/0.005)
(n = 64)
0.0084
(2.21/0.030)
(n = 65)
(12) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(0.76/0.452) (3.56/0.001)
8 Jun 2004
(13)
The Basel Committee said it had considered the potential eﬀect
of IFRS on regulatory capital and decided that, for regulatory
capital purposes, it would be appropriate for national
supervisors to exclude cumulative gains and losses on cash ﬂow
hedges that are recognized directly in equity from the deﬁnition
of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. It said it believed that the gains and
losses arising from changes in an institution’s own credit risk
under the fair value option on liabilities should also be excluded
from Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital
0.0019
(1.59/0.113)
(n = 216)
0.0002
(0.10/0.920)
(n = 39)
0.0005
(0.25/0.801)
(n = 39)
0.0001
(0.03/0.976)
(n = 64)
0.0043
(1.86/0.067)
(n = 65)
(13) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(0.25/0.804) (1.42/0.157)
20 July 2004
(14)
Further to its press release of 8 June 2004, the Basel Committee
considered the potential eﬀect on regulatory capital of IFRS. It
made no adjustments to capital adequacy in response to IFRS
in these areas: deﬁnition of the trading book, equity/liability
classiﬁcation, intangible assets (including goodwill), deferred
tax assets, pension costs, stock option costs and leasing
0.0076
(4.96/0.000)
(n = 216)
0.0075
(1.82/0.076)
(n = 39)
0.0052
(1.38/0.176)
(n = 39)
0.0069
(2.47/0.016)
(n = 64)
0.0095
(2.68/0.009)
(n = 65)
(14) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(0.42/0.679) (0.58/0.564)
(continued on next page)
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Table 8 (continued)
Press release
date (Event
no.)
Event description Overall Mean
CAR (t stat/p
value) (n = obs)
High Tier1 cap
group CAR (t stat/
p value) (n = obs)
Low Tier1 cap
group CAR
(t stat/p value)
(n = obs)
Retail group
CAR (t stat/p
value)
(n = obs)
Corporate group
CAR (t stat/p
value) (n = obs)
15 Dec 2004
(15)
The Basel Committee considered additional issues related to the
potential eﬀect on regulatory capital of the implementation of
certain IFRS. The Committee accepted IAS 39 treatment of
impairment losses that reduce Tier 1 capital, and also said it
was considering excluding unrealized gains and losses on loans
designated as available-for-sale from the regulatory deﬁnition
of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital
0.0008
(0.41/0.685)
(n = 219)
0.0019
(0.72/0.477)
(n = 39)
0.0017
(0.56/0.577)
(n = 39)
0.00001
(0.01/0.996)
(n = 64)
0.0032
(0.66/0.514)
(n = 65)
(15) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(0.90/0.373) (0.58/0.562)
11 Apr 2005
(16)
The Basel Committee and International Organization of
Securities Commissions proposed solutions for certain trading-
related exposures and double-default eﬀects under Basel II. The
Committee issued a paper for public comment outlining
proposed capital requirements for banks’ exposures to certain
trading-related activities, including counterparty credit risk and
a solution for double-default eﬀects (the risk that both a
borrower and guarantor default on the same obligation)
0.0018
(1.34/0.180)
(n = 221)
0.0035
(1.54/0.132)
(n = 39)
0.0032
(1.22/0.228)
(n = 39)
0.0009
(0.34/0.734)
(n = 64)
0.00002
(0.01/0.993)
(n = 65)
(16) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(1.93/0.057) (0.25/0.803)
13 July 2005
(17)
The Basel Committee issued documents on the use of the fair
value option, estimation of LGD during economic downturns,
treatment of certain trading-related exposures and double-
default eﬀects under Basel II. This proposal did not impose
additional accounting or disclosure requirements beyond those
set out in IAS 39, except that gains and losses arising from
changes in a bank’s own credit risk associated with its liabilities
should not be included in capital.
0.0044
(2.71/0.007)
(n = 222)
0.0144
(3.42/0.001)
(n = 39)
0.0057
(2.30/0.027)
(n = 39)
0.0061
(2.03/0.046)
(n = 64)
0.0015
(0.61/0.543)
(n = 65)
(17) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(4.12/0.000) (1.18/0.240)
18 Jul 2005
(18)
The Basel Committee discussed solutions for the application of
Basel II to certain trading-related exposures, including
counterparty credit risk and the treatment of double-default
eﬀects
0.0025
(1.62/0.106)
(n = 222)
0.0046
(1.82/0.077)
(n = 39)
0.0038
(1.22/0.231)
(n = 39)
0.0044
(1.73/0.088)
(n = 64)
0.0063
(2.58/0.012)
(n = 65)
(18) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(0.20/0.839) (0.54/0.593)
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24 May
2006 (19)
The Basel Committee maintained calibration of the Basel II
framework based on the results of the ﬁfth Quantitative Impact
Study (QIS 5). The QIS results for G10 countries showed that
the minimum required capital under Pillar 1 of that framework
would decrease relative to the current Accord. For
internationally active banks, the minimum required capital
would decrease on average by 6.8%, with a greater reduction
for those using the advanced IRB approach
0.0216
(10.81/0.000)
(n = 223)
0.0109
(4.13/0.000)
(n = 39)
0.0131
(4.35/0.000)
(n = 39)
0.0144
(5.57/0.000)
(n = 64)
0.0288
(7.23/0.000)
(n = 65)
(19) t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(0.54/0.592) (3.03/0.003)
Events 1–6 3 June 1999 to 10 July 2002. The Basel Committee issued a
consultative paper on Basel II, provided details via
supplementary documents, issued its second consultative
package, reached consensus on important issues and conﬁrmed
the implementation timeline in this period
0.0096
(8.88/0.000)
(n = 1224)
0.0030
(1.22/0.222)
(n = 231)
0.0139
(–6.68/0.000)
(n = 233)
0.0069
(3.80/0.000)
(n = 375)
0.0116
(6.38/0.000)
(n = 383)
1–6 t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(3.83/0.000) (2.75/0.006)
Events 7–12 1 October 2002 to 11 May 2004. This period covers the
quantitative impact surveys, issue of the third consultative
paper, agreement on cross-border implementation and
publication of the comprehensive package
0.0068
(9.29/0.000)
(n = 1278)
0.0119
(8.28/0.000)
(n = 234)
0.0081
(5.03/0.000)
(n = 234)
0.0112
(9.51/0.000)
(n = 384)
0.0061
(4.55/0.000)
(n = 390)
7–12 t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(1.15/0.251) (1.617/0.106)
Events 1–12 3 June 1999 to 11 May 2004. This period encompasses the
conceptualization of Basel II, issues of the second and third
consultative packages and publication of the comprehensive
package
0.0012
(1.82/0.070)
(n = 2502)
0.0045
(3.04/0.002)
(n = 465)
0.0029
(2.03/0.043)
(n = 467)
0.0022
(1.99/0.047)
(n = 759)
0.0026
(2.27/0.023)
(n = 773)
1–12 t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(3.60/0.000) (3.02/0.003)
Events 13–
19
8 June 2004 to 24 May 2006. This period was after the issue of
comprehensive guidelines, covering further reﬁnements on
trading exposures, additional quantitative impact studies,
evaluation of IFRS eﬀects on capital rules and the ﬁnal
milestone before implementation of the standardized approach
0.0033
(5.16/0.000)
(n = 1539)
0.0008
(0.68/0.500)
(n = 273)
0.0035
(3.08/0.002)
(n = 273)
0.0014
(1.38/0.170)
(n = 448)
0.0054
(4.10/0.000)
(n = 455)
13–19 t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between
retail/corp. groups (t stat/p value)
(2.59/0.010) (2.40/0.017)
Events 1–19 3 June 1999 to 24 May 2006. This period ranges from the
issuance of a conceptual paper to the ﬁnal milestone before
implementation of the standardized approach by most banks at
the end of 2006
0.0005
(1.07/0.286)
(n = 4041)
0.0025
(2.42/0.016)
(n = 738)
0.0005
(0.52/0.602)
(n = 740)
0.0019
(2.40/0.016)
(n = 1207)
0.0003
(0.38/0.705)
(n = 1228)
1–19 t-test for diﬀ between high/low Tier 1 cap and between retail/corp.
groups (t stat/p value)
(2.09/0.034) (2.24/0.025)
a A negative t-statistic for Tier 1 capital groups means that the market reaction to the low-Tier 1 capital group is less positive (or more negative) than that to the high-Tier 1 capital
group. A positive t-statistic for the corporate banking group means that the market reaction to the retail banking group is more positive (or less negative) than that to the corporate
banking group.
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response to such lobbying, the Basel Committee revised the rules to reduce the capital requirements for mort-
gage loans and SMEs. The regulations were also watered down for brokerage and securities houses such as
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Finally, there was also growing awareness that some banks could poten-
tially reduce their capital requirements under Basel II’s advanced IRB approach.
We also compare the market reaction to low- and high-capital banks. During the early part of our sample
period (Events 1–12), that reaction was more negative for low- than high-capital banks, most likely because
the market was concerned that the Basel II rules would have a greater adverse eﬀect on the former. However,
during the later part of the period (Events 13–19), the market was more receptive to low-capital banks than to
their high-capital counterparts, possibly because subsequent reﬁnements and political lobbying mitigated
Basel II’s eﬀects on the former.
Considering all 19 events together, we ﬁnd that the overall market abnormal returns to the full sample,
banks with low-Tier 1 capital adequacy ratios and banks with more corporate banking exposure are not
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. It seems that the market recovered fairly quickly from the initial neg-
ative shock of the Basel II announcement. However, for banks with high-Tier 1 capital adequacy ratios and
those with more retail banking exposure, we ﬁnd the overall market abnormal reaction to the 19 Basel II
events to be positive. Overall, the evidence suggests that the implementation of Basel II beneﬁtted strongly
capitalized banks and those with greater retail banking exposure because the regulatory changes allowed these
banks to gain a competitive advantage over weakly capitalized banks and those with greater corporate bank-
ing exposure.
5. Conclusion
This study examines the interaction between a major banking regulatory policy change (i.e., the Basel II
rule changes) and its eﬀects on bank managers’ discretionary behavior. We ﬁnd evidence to suggest that cor-
porate banking managers in weaker banks with low capital adequacy ratios engaged in income smoothing to a
greater extent in the Basel II period than their counterparts in stronger banks, most likely because of the more
stringent capital requirements imposed on corporate and investment banking by the regulatory changes. We
also ﬁnd such smoothing to be more prevalent in the latter part of the Basel II period, being non-existent in the
early part.
Similarly, we ﬁnd corporate banking managers in weaker banks with low capital adequacy ratios to have
reduced the timeliness of their loan loss provisions in the latter part of the Basel II period. In additional cross-
sectional tests, we demonstrate that income smoothing and the timeliness of loan loss provisions vary
depending on the strictness of the bank enforcement regime under which banks operate. Finally, we ﬁnd that
the market reacted more negatively to banks with more corporate banking exposure than to those with more
retail banking exposure in the Basel II period. However, the negative market reaction to the former was
negligible toward the end of that period.
The study oﬀers important input to policymakers, showing that banks that are aﬀected by capital regula-
tions may engage in such discretionary behavior as income smoothing and the delayed recognition of loan
losses. The corporate banking sector faces increased regulatory risks as a result of Basel II implementation.
To mitigate those risks, it appears that the managers who oversee the corporate banking business of weaker
banks engage in income smoothing activities and delayed loan loss recognition.
Appendix A
Source: Bank of America 2007 Annual Report Note 22
The following tables present total revenue, net of interest expenses, on an FTE basis and net income for
2007, 2006 and 2005, total assets as of 31 December in 2007 and 2006 for each business segment and all other
items
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Business segments
At and for the Year Ended December 31 Total corporation (1) Global consumer and small
business banking (2, 3)
(Dollars in millions) 2007 2006 2005 2007 2006 2005
Net interest income (4) $36,182 $35,815 $31,569 $28,809 $28,197 $17,571
Noninterest income 31,886 37,989 26,438 18,873 16,729 10,848
Total revenue, net of interest expense 68,068 73,804 58,007 47,682 44,926 28,419
Provision for credit losses (5) 8385 5010 4014 12,929 8534 4706
Amortization of intangibles 1676 1755 809 1336 1452 480
Other noninterest expense 35,334 33,842 27,872 18,724 16,923 12,277
Income before income taxes 22,673 33,197 25,312 14,693 18,017 10,956
Income tax expense (4) 7691 12,064 8847 5263 6639 3934
Net income $14,982 $21,133 $16,465 $9430 $11,378 $7022
Global corporate and
investment banking (2)
Global wealth and
investment management (2)
(Dollars in millions) 2007 2006 2005 2007 2006 2005
Net interest income (4) $11,217 $9877 $10,337 $3857 $3671 $3554
Noninterest income 2200 11,284 9530 4066 3686 3320
Total revenue, net of interest expense 13,417 21,161 19,867 7923 7357 6874
Provision for credit losses 652 9 44 14 (39) (5)
Amortization of intangibles 178 218 239 150 72 74
Other noninterest expense 11,747 11,360 10,217 4485 3795 3667
Income before income taxes 840 9574 9367 3274 3529 3138
Income tax expense (4) 302 3542 3413 1179 1306 1126
Net income $538 $6032 $5954 $2095 $2223 $2012
(Dollars in millions) 2007 All other (2, 3)
2006 2005
Net interest income (4) $(7701) $(5930) $107
Noninterest income 6747 6290 2740
Total revenue, net of interest expense (954) 360 2847
Provision for credit losses (5) (5210) (3494) (731)
Amortization of intangibles 12 13 16
Other noninterest expense 378 1764 1711
Income before income taxes 3866 2077 1851
Income tax expense (4) 947 577 374
Net income $2919 $1500 $1477
(1) There were no material intersegment revenues among the segments.
(2) Total assets include asset allocations to match liabilities (i.e., deposits).
(3) GCSBB is presented on a managed basis with a corresponding oﬀset recorded in All Other.
(4) FTE basis.
(5) Provision for credit losses represents: For GCSBB – Provision for credit losses on held loans combined with realized credit losses
associated with the securitized loan portfolio and for All Other – Provision for credit losses combined with the GCSBB securitization
oﬀset.
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